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ABUSE OF GUARDIANSHIP LAWS 

IN THE "DEPROGRAMMING" CONTEXT 

I. INTRODUCTION 
During the 1960's, many people in our society rejected estab­
lished economic, political, and religious institutions. As a result, 
they experimented with cultural alternatives. 1 Religious attitudes 
changed, creating many esoteric religious groups. Many parents, 
dissatisfied with their children's2 religious choice, have resorted to 
the use of guardianship laws. By gaining custody of the child, par­
ents can use various methods in an attempt to re-orient the child's 
religious beliefs. The use of guardianship laws in this context often 
denies procedural and substantive constitutional rights of the child. 
Many of the religious groups that became popular in the 1960's 
and early 1970's are not new. Some have roots in the Eastern 
world, 3 while others are offshoots of traditional western religions. 4 
Many of these religious sects require their members to radically 
change their life-styles after joining. Followers may be urged to 
begin a new life of residential insulation, devoting all of their time 
and effort to working for the group.5 The devotee's new life may be 
1. C. GLOCK & R. BELLAH, THE NEW RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS xi (1976)", 
This book presents an extensive sociological study of many of the religious sects and 
organizations that contributed to the youth counterculture of the 1960's. 
2. The word "children" as it is used in this discussion refers to persons aged 
18 and older. 
3. The International Society of Krishna Consciousness was founded in New 
York in 1966 by A.C. Bhaktivedanta, who came to this country from India "to estab­
lish an American version of an Indian religious discipline that has existed since the 
fifth century." C. GLOCK & R. BELLAH, supra note 1, at 32. The Healthy-Happy­
Holy Organization, begun in 1969 by Yogi Bhajan who came to the United States to 
teach yoga, combines American and Indian (Sikh religion) elements. ld. at 5-8. The 
Divine Light Mission, which began in the early 1970's, was founded by an Indian, 
Guru Maharaj Ji. ld. at 52. The Unification Church, established by Reverend Sun 
Myung Moon, a Korean, espouses a religion which contains "elements of Oriental 
ancestor worship ... mixed with spiritualism, Victorian sexual ethics and bits of 
evangelical Protestantism." Life With Father Moon, NEWSWEEK, June 14, 1976, at 60. 
4. Examples include the Christian World Liberation Front, the Campus 
Crusade for Christ, Jews for Jesus, the Children of God, and the Catholic Charismat­
ic Renewal. These groups are discussed in C. GLOCK & R. BELLAH, supra note 1. 
5. See Belford, Sun Myung Moon and the Unification Church, INTELLECT, 
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extremely structured, including the regulation of former family at­
tachments. 
Although the tenets of these religions vary signmcantly, a 
common quality among them is the enthusiasm with which de­
votees practice their religion and attempt to recruit new members. 
Explanations for such strong commitments to these religious sects 
have been offered by various writers and by sect members them­
selves. 6 
Some analysts have suggested that zealousness in devotees re­
sults from psychological kidnapping. Mental resistance is weak­
ened; communication with the outside world is cut off; and, as a 
result, members find it psychologically difficult to leave the group. 7 
Religious groups have been charged with "brainwashing."8 Other 
writers claim that devotees are very dependent people who might 
turn to drugs if they had no group upon which to rely.9 Group 
April 1977, at 336-37; Donohoe, A Weekend with the Moonies, INTELLECT, April 
1977, at 338-39; Walsh, 'Moonies'-Religious Converts or Psychic Victims?, AMER­
ICA, May 14, 1977, at 438-40; Life With Father Moon, supra note 3, at 60-62, 65­
66; The Children of God: Disciples of Deception, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, February 
18, 1977, at 18-23. 
6. The Children of God: Disciples of Deception, supra note 5, at 18-23 (inter­
view with two former members of the Children of God, who discuss beliefs and 
activities of the group and present their thoughts as to why people join). For a dis­
cussion of different types of people joining sects and various reasons for joining, see 
C. GLOCK & R. BELLAH, supra note 1. 
7. Edwards, Rescue from a Fanatic Cult, READER'S DIGEST, April 1977, at 
129-33; Robbins, Even a Moonie Has Civil Rights, NATION, February 26, 1977, at 
238, 241; Life With Father Moon, supra note 3, at 60-62, 65-66. 
8. Note, People v. Religious Cults: Legal Guidelines for Criminal Activities, 
Tort Liability, and Parental Remedies, II SUFFOLK L. REV. 1025, 1026-28 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as Note, Legal Guidelines J. Thomas Robbins defines "brainwash­
ing" as a term which expresses "disapproval of the way in which someone has been 
influenced by someone else." Robbins, Even a Moonie Has Civil Rights, supra note 
7, at 241. Robbins feels that "brainwashing" is an ideal term for those wishing to 
suppress religious cults because (I) it cannot be disproved, (2) it implies concern 
with the manner in which a belief is induced rather than the content of a belief, and 
(3) it implies that converts are victims rather than people asserting constitutional 
rights. Robbins, 'Brainwashing' & Religious Freedom, NATION, April 30, 1977, at 
518. For a discussion of "brainwashing" as it relates to religious groups, see Note, 
Legal Issues in the Use of Guardianship Procedures to Remove Members of Cults, 
18 ARIZ. L. REV. 1095, II24-32 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Legal IssuesJ. For a 
discussion of the criminal liability and civil liability for intentional torts that reli­
gious sects may incur, see Note, Legal Guidelines, supra at 1030-45. For a discussion 
of legal attacks that have been made on cults, see Note, Legal Issues, supra at IIOO­
01. 
9. Poett, Do They Have the Right To Be Weird?, New York Village Voice, 
October 24, 1977, at 24, col. 1. This article also discusses the results of studies of 
religious group members by J. Thomas Ungerleider and David Wellisch of the 
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membership "may be an integrative, adaptive thing rather than a 
maladaptive thing. "10 
Because many parents insist that the devotees' minds have 
been programmed, a technique has been developed which is de­
signed to "deprogram" the mind and restore religious freedom.!1 
"Deprogamming" typically involves forcibly seizing the devotee, 
taking him to a place from which he cannot escape, and keeping 
him captive until he renounces his religion and decides to return to 
his parents. The "deprogrammer" questions the sect member about 
the religion and explores inconsistencies in the sect's teachings. 
The religion is ridiculed, and the devotee is told that the sect has 
"deceived" its disciples. With the devotee's family participating in 
the process, severe psychological and emotional pressures can be 
applied. 12 
The "deprogramming" process requires physical custody of the 
devotee. Parents and attorneys have attempted to obtain this cus­
tody through the use of state guardianship laws. 13 When a court 
grants custody in these situations, attempts at "deprogramming" 
are implicitly legalized. 14 
Neuropsychic Institute at UCLA. The two researchers concluded that devotees are 
considerably brighter than average and able to evaluate the consequences of their 
actions. 
10. Id. 
11. The concept of "deprogramming" was developed in 1971 by Ted Patrick. 
His book describes the beginnings of "deprogramming" and some of the specific 
"deprogrammings" in which he has participated. Most of his efforts have been con­
centrated on members of the Divine Light Mission, the International Society of 
Krishna Consciousness, the Children of God, the Unification Church, Love Israel, 
and the New Testament Missionary Fellowship. T. PATRICK, LET OUR CHILDREN 
Go! (1976). "Deprogrammings," however, have also been reported by a priest of the 
Old Catholic Ministry, a Roman Catholic, and a member of a labor group. Robbins, 
Even a Moonie Has Civil Rights, supra note 7, at 242; Fighting Cults: The Tucson 
Tactic, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, February 4, 1977, at 59-60. For a compilation of docu­
ments relating to "deprogramming" and copies of affidavits of persons who have 
been subjected to "deprogramming," see "Deprogramming:" A Book of Documents. 
This is a collection of documents compiled by the ACLU and can be obtained by 
writing to the following address: American Civil Liberties Union, 22 East 40th 
Street, New York, New York 10016. 
12. For a more detailed discussion of the "deprogramming" process, see T. 
PATRICK, supra note 11. 
13. Note, Legal Guidelines, supra note 8, at 1050 n.141 (grantings of conser­
vatorships and temporary guardianships). 
14. When a court grants custody for "deprogramming" purposes and a devotee 
later sues the court alleging that the granting of custody violated procedural and 
substantive constitutional rights, the requisite state action needed to trigger the four­
teenth amendment can be found. Katz v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 73 Cal. 
App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977). For a discussion of this case, see text accom­
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II. STATUTORY AND PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS 
A legal guardian has the right to care for the person, property, 
or both, of another who is unable to act competently for himself. 15 
State statutory procedures limit the power to appoint guardians. 16 
Although the guardianship process varies from state to state, 
certain patterns prevail. Once a guardianship petition is filed by a 
person interested in the proposed ward's welfare, a hearing is 
scheduled. At the hearing, witnesses may be presented. 17 On the 
basis of the facts and circumstances of each case, the court deter­
mines whether or not it is in the best interest of the proposed ward 
or the ward's property that a guardian be appointed. 1s 
A safeguard in this procedure allows an individual to contest 
the petition before being declared a ward. Absent exceptional cir­
cumstances, the proposed ward is present at a guardianship hearing 
and is entitled to due process consisting of notice and an opportu­
nity to be heard. 19 Some statutes specifically entitle the proposed 
ward to be present at the hearing, see and hear evidence pre­
sented, be represented by counsel, present evidence, and cross­
examine witnesses. 2o This protective process can be time-con­
suming. 
panying notes 39-46 infra. When the devotee later sues the parents or persons re­
sponsihle for the actual "deprogramming," however, there may he a prohlem finding 
the requisite state action. Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (parental 
use of state conservatorship procedures for "deprogramming" purposes did not sup­
ply the necessary state action for a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The issue of state 
action is heyond the scope of this comment. 
15. E.g., Shaw v. Small, 124 Me. 36, 38, 125 A. 496, 498 (1924); Daniels v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 135 Pa. Super. Ct. 450,453, 5 A.2d 608, 61l (1939). Some 
state statutes refer to guardians as conservators, committees, or curators; others use 
different terms for persons granted custody of another person than for persons 
granted custody of another's property. The term "guardian" will be used throughout 
this comment unless referring to a specific state's statutes. 
16. For an in-depth discussion of the guardianship and conservatorship laws of 
particular states, see State, Guardianships and Conseroatorships-Protection of Per­
sons Under Disability and Their Property, 9 CREIGHTON L. REV. 507 (1976) (Ne­
braska) and Comment, North Carolina Guardianship Laws-The Need for Change, 
54 N.C.L. REv. 389 (1976). 
17. These witnesses may present medical testimony which may be the result of 
a voluntary examination of the proposed ward. In some states, the court may request 
an examination by a physician. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 14-5303 (1975) (court must 
request examination). 
18. For example, in a hearing for the appointment of a guardian of an insane 
person, the question of insanity is one of fact to be determined by the court on the 
basis ofall the evidence before it. Cogan v. Cogan, 202 Mass. 58,88 N.E. 662 (1909). 
19. Even where not specified by statute, notice may be necessary in order to 
comply with constitutional due process requirements. McKinstry v. Dewey, 192 Iowa 
753, 185 N.W. 565 (1921) (notice required by common law and due process). 
20. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-5303 (1975). 
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The length of time involved in complying with the due process 
requirements makes these permanent guardianship procedures in­
convenient for "deprogramming" purposes. H a state offers the al­
ternative of a temporary guardianship appointment,21 a quick way 
to gain custody for a short period of time is provided. Temporary 
guardianship procedures are generally reserved for emergency situ­
ations. Time limits for temporary appointments are usually pro­
vided by statute, with appointments generally granted only until 
permanent guardianship hearings are complete. 22 
The potential danger of temporary guardianship appointments 
is that, unlike permanent guardianship proceedings, they can be 
granted ex parte. Many state statutes provide for a waiver of notice 
as to the petition for a temporary guardianship appointment and a 
postponement of the ward's opportunity to be heard until the later 
hearing for the permanent guardianship.23 Temporary appoint­
ments without notice, where the court has found them to be neces­
sary for the welfare of the ward or the ward's property, have been 
held constitutional. 24 
Since guardianship laws were originally developed to protect 
the interests of minors, the aged, and others incapable of caring for 
themselves, the procedures are, in theory, designed to protect the 
rights and well-being of the ward and his property. Recently, how­
ever, these statutes have been used to gain the custody necessary 
21. For example, in Arizona, a temporary guardian may be appointed for an in­
capacitated person. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 14-5310 (1975). In Connecticut, a temporary 
conservator may be appointed for a person's property if the person is shown to be 
"incapable of managing his affairs." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-72 (West 1960). In 
Massachusetts, a temporary guardian may be appointed for a person who is mentally 
ill. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 201, § 14 (West 1958). 
22. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-72 (West 1960) (not more than 30 
days); D.C. Code § 21-1505 (1973) (only until a permanent conservator can be ap­
pointed). 
23. In Arizona, the court may exercise the power of a guardian pending notice 
and hearing if an incapacitated person has no guardian and an emergency exists. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-5310 (1975). In Massachusetts, notice of a petition for a tem­
porary guardianship must be given at least 72 hours before the hearing unless the 
situation requires an immediate appointment. MASS. PROB. CT. R. 29B. 
24. Bumpus v. French, 179 Mass. 131, 60 N.E. 414 (1901) (ex parte appoint­
ment of temporary guardian for insane person does not violate due process clause of 
United States Constitution). The Supreme Court, however, has begun to "[fasten] 
strict procedural requirements on governmental action aimed at controlling the exer­
cise of first amendment rights," particularly in the area of obscenity. Monaghan, First 
Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 518 (1970). See Carroll v. Presi­
dent and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (where first amendment 
freedom of speech was involved, no ex parte temporary restraining order could issue 
without a showing that notice and an opportunity to be heard were impossible). 
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for "deprogramming."25 The ramifications of the use of guard­
ianship laws become important in the "deprogramming" context 
because the guardianship decree legalizes custody of the ward. 
Originally parents and "deprogrammers" would trick devotees 
into a meeting or wait in places where devotees frequented in 
order to abduct them. 26 The guardianship decree, issued before 
the seizure of the ward, authorizes the seizure and charges the 
guardian with a fiduciary duty27 to do that which is in the best 
interest of the ward. To the guardian, often a parent, "deprogram­
ming" is clearly in the best interest of their allegedly "brain­
washed" child. However, failure by courts to recognize the limits 
of guardianship procedures has resulted in abuse of the guard­
ianship statutes. Thus, the guardianship process has become a tool 
used against capable, healthy adults wholly outside the context for 
which it was designed. 
Two types of abuse result from the use of guardianship laws in 
the "deprogramming" context. First, existing guardianship laws and 
procedural safeguards are not being followed by some courts. 28 
Second, even when the statutes are applied in a correct procedural 
context, they are often applied in a manner which denies individu­
als of substantive constitutional rights. 29 This denial occurs when 
evidence of an individual's religious beliefs and affiliations forms 
the sole basis upon which the guardianship decree is granted. 
25. Plowman, Deprogramming: A Right to Rescue?, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, May 
7, 1976, at 39 (conservatorship granted to mother of member of the Alamo Founda­
tion); Poett, supra note 9, at 23, col. 4 (parents of four members of the Alamo Founda­
tion granted ex parte guardianships of their children); Robbins, 'Brainwashing' & 
Religious Freedom, supra note 8, at 518 (parents of members of the Unification 
Church granted custody of their adult children for 30 days); Fighting Cults: The 
Tucson Tactic, supra note 11, at 57 (temporary conservatorship granted in Maryland); 
id. at 59 (guardianship granted in Oklahoma); Note, Legal Guidelines, supra note 8, 
at 1050 n.141 (grantings of guardianships); Note, Legal Issues, supra note 8, at 1HO 
n.106 (granting of temporary conservatorships). 
26. This procedure is described in T. PATRICK, supra note 11. This form of 
custody can, however, lead to criminal or civil actions for assault and battery, conspi­
racy, kidnapping, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and 
false imprisonment. See Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717 (D. R.1. 1978) (devotee 
failed to prove assault and battery, false imprisonment, or violation of civil rights); 
Willoughby, Man Sues Parents In Religious Deprogramming, Washington Star, 
April 21, 1977, § A, at 12, col. 1; Note, Legal Issues, supra note 8, at 1102-03. For a 
discussion of kidnapping and false imprisonment charges and the defense of "neces­
sity" as it applies to "deprogramming" cases, see Note, Legal Guidelines, supra note 
8, at 1046-50. 
27. See, e.g., 21 J. LOMBARD, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE § 903 (1962). 
28. This results in a clear denial of due process. See notes 47-54 infra and 
accompanying text. 
29. See notes 55-83 infra and accompanying text. 
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Two cases illustrate the first type of abuse, judicial misapplica­
tion of a guardianship statute. In the first case, Walter Robert 
Taylor,30 a twenty-two-year-old priest of the Old Catholic Church,31 
was placed in the temporary custody of his father who objected to 
Taylor's religious orientation. 32 Taylor was never given the statuto­
rily required notice33 nor was he represented by counsel. The court 
granted the guardianship on the basis of the testimony of Taylor's 
father and the written opinion of a clinical psychologist who had 
never examined Taylor. 34 The order was revoked by the same 
court one week later, after the judge discovered that Oklahoma law 
does not provide for orders of temporary guardianships. By that 
time, however, pursuant to the order, Taylor had been forcibly 
seized from the monastery where he lived and was taken to Ohio 
where he was subjected to "deprogramming" techniques.3s 
The court in the case of Carl Kent Trimble, unlike the Taylor 
court, realized from the beginning that the laws of the District of 
Columbia did not cover Trimble's situation. 36 Trimble's parents 
30. The plight of Walter Robert Taylor is discussed in Willoughby, supra note 
26, and in Fighting Cults: The Tucson Tactic, supra note 11, at 58-59. 
3l. The Old Catholic Church is a religious organization which separated from 
the Roman Catholic Church in the 18th century. There are nearly 500,000 members 
in the United States. Willoughby, supra note 26. 
32. Under Oklahoma law, a guardianship of any mentally incompetent or in­
sane person may be granted. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 58, § 852 (West 1965) provides as 
follows: 
§ 852. Guardian appointed, when 
If after a full hearing and examination upon such petition, it appears to 
the judge of the county court that the person in question is incapable of 
taking care of himself and managing his property, he must appoint a guard­
ian of his person and estate with the powers and duties in this article 
specified. R.L.191O, § 6539, as amended Laws 1953, p. 247, § 80, reenacted 
Laws 1955, p. 302, § 2. 
(Footnote omitted). 
33. Notice of the time and place of the hearing must be given to the alleged 
incompetent not less than five days before. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 851 (West 
1965). This notice requirement is mandatory; and without the prescribed notice, the 
court has no jurisdiction to handle the guardianship case. Colby v. Jacobs, 179 Ok!. 
170, 64 P .2d 881 (1937). 
34. The clinical psychologist who wrote the opinion is Kevin M. Gilmartin. 
Willoughby, supra note 26. Gilmartin is associated with the Freedom of Thought 
Foundation, an organization established to help parents gain custody of their chil­
dren for "deprogramming" purposes. 
35. Taylor later filed suit in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, against his parents and 
the Freedom of Thought Foundation, alleging deprivation of civil rights, legal and 
medical malpractice, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and assault and battery. Id. 
36. The laws of the District of Columbia proVide for guardianship of a substan­
tially retarded person. D.C. Code § 21-1106 (1973). They provide for an order that a 
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were granted the temporary guardianship over their son in 
superior court in Washington, D.C.37 The deciding judge based 
his order not on any statute or case law, but rather on his belief 
that the court has certain inherent powers. An ex parte hearing was 
held; Trimble was neither given notice nor represented by counsel. 
Most of the testimony involved the unusual characteristics of the 
religion to which Trimble was devoted. Four days after the grant­
ing of the temporary guardianship, Trimble was given court­
appointed lawyers. The two attorneys had to negotiate with Trim­
ble's parents' attorneys for an opportunity to see their client. By 
that time, eleven days later, Trimble had already been "depro­
grammed. "38 
While neither Taylor nor Trimble was provided an opportunity 
to challenge the guardianship proceedings before "deprogram­
ming" occurred and they were deprived of their freedom, five 
adult children made such a challenge in the California Court of 
Appeal. Katz v. Superior Court of San Francisc0 39 illustrates the 
second type of abuse which can occur when guardianship laws are 
applied accurately, but outside of their intended context. Conser­
vatorship orders had been granted to the parents of five adult chil­
dren after an adversary hearing in the Superior Court of San Fran­
cisco. 4o At the hearing, the parents presented expert testimony of a 
psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist to show that the proposed 
wards had been "brainwashed" and suffered psychological damage 
conservator, already appointed to care for the estate of a person who "is unable, by 
reason of advanced age, mental weakness not amounting to unsoundness of mind, 
mental illness, ' .. , or physical incapacity, properly to care for his property," be 
responsible for that person's personal welfare as well. D.C. Code §§ 21-1501, 21­
1506 (1973). They also provide for guardianship of infants. D.C. Code § 21-101 
(1973). This guardianship terminates, however, when the child becomes 18 years 
of age. D.C. Code § 21-104 (Supp. 1978). At the time the temporary guardianship 
was granted, Trimble was 22 years of age. 
37. This case is discussed in Cohan, Basic 'Moonie' Case Issue Was One of 
Citizenship, Washington Post, October 10, 1976, § B, at 1, col. 1. 
38. All of this occurred just eight months after Trimble's parents had tried to 
get custody of their son in California. There the court had ordered Trimble to submit 
to a psychiatric examination. The psychiatrist said that Trimble was mentally normal, 
that he had not been "brainwashed," and that there was no evidence to substantiate 
the allegation. Id. 
39. 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977). 
40. The superior court judge believed that the mother-father-child relationship 
is the very essence of civilization and is never-ending. It appears that this is what 
influenced his decision, for he never discussed "what facts he considered were es­
tablished by the evidence." Id. at 958 n.8, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 240 n.8 and accompany­
ing text. 
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because of their involvement with the Unification Church. 41 A 
psychiatrist and a psychologist appearing on behalf of the proposed 
wards testified that the children suffered from no mental pathologi­
cal disorder, that the allegations of "brainwashing" were merely 
speculative, and that the behavior exhibited by the proposed wards 
was no more unusual than that which one sees in any person de­
voted to a religious belief. 42 The reviewing court held that the stat­
ute under which the conservatorship orders were granted43 was 
unconstitutionally vague,44 that the evidence presented in the case 
did not warrant the appointments,45 and that the appointments for 
purposes of "deprogramming" violated the conservatees' freedom of 
religion. 46 
As Katz recognized, the use of guardianship laws in the "de­
programming" context violates individual substantive constitutional 
rights. Defenses to this application of guardianship laws center 
around procedural due process and substantive constitutional 
guarantees. 
41. ld. at 966-68, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 248-50. 
42. ld. at 968, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 250. 
43. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1751 (West Supp. 1977) (allowed for the appointment 
of "a conservator of the person and property or person or property of any adult per­
son who by reason of advanced age, illness, injury, mental weakness, intemperance, 
addiction to drugs or other disability, or other cause is unable properly to care for 
himself or for his property, or who for said causes or for any other cause is likely to 
be deceived or imposed upon by artful or designing persons ...."). This statute has 
subsequently been amended by 1976 Cal. Stats. ch. 1357, § 25, operative July 1, 
1977. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1751 (West Supp. 1978) provides as follows: 
§ 1751. Reasons for apPOintment 
Upon petition as provided in this chapter, the superior court, if shtisfied 
by sufficient evidence of the need therefor, shall appoint a conservator of 
the person and I?roperty or person or property of any adult person who * * *, 
in the case of a conservatorship of the person, is unable properly to provide 
for his personal needs for physical health, food, clothing or shelter, and, in 
the case of a conservatorship of the property, is substantially unable to 
manage his own financial resources, or resist fraud or undue influence, or 
for whom a guardian could be appointed under Division 4 of this code, or 
who voluntarily requests the same and to the satisfaction of the court estab­
lishes good cause therefor, or who is an absentee as defined in Section 
1751.5. "Substantial inability" shall not be evidence solely by isolated inci­
dents of negligence or improvidence. The court, in its discretion, may ap­
point one or more conservators. 
Underlinings indicate changes or additions by amendment. Asterisks indicate dele­

tions by amendment. 

The California guardianship and conservatorship statutes and their recent amend­

ments are discussed in Note, Legal Issues, supra note 8, at 1111-14. 

44. 73 Cal. App. 3d at 963, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 245. 
45. ld. at 971, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 253. 
46. ld. at 974, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 256. 
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III. DEFENDING AGAINST A PETITION FOR A GUARDIANSHIP 
A. Procedural Due Process 
An individual subjected to "deprogramming" loses rights of 
freedom of association and free exercise of religion that are pro­
tected by the first and fourteenth amendments. 47 Proceedings to 
appoint a permanent guardian, which allow the proposed ward 
notice and an opportunity to be heard, afford the ward the requi­
site due process by allowing the presentation of defenses and the 
assertion of constitutional rights. However, ex parte proceedings in 
which a temporary guardian is appointed deny such an opportu­
nity.48 Recognizing the need to protect the rights of the proposed 
ward, several temporary guardianship statutes include provisions 
which purport to safeguard those rights. For the most part, these 
safeguards are inadequate. 
One procedural safeguard in some states' guardianship laws 
requires that a petition for a permanent guardianship be filed with 
the temporary guardianship petition. 49 This provides an opportu­
. nity at a later hearing for the ward to refute evidence of incompe­
tence and assert constitutional rights and defenses. Constitutional 
protection, however, is needed at the first hearing because the 
unique short-term nature of "deprogramming" defeats this safe­
guard. 50 If "deprogramming" has been successful, the individual 
will be convinced that the religious group deceived her, and that 
she did not join the group of her own free will. Therefore, she will 
have no desire to prove that she was competent while she was a 
devotee. The devotee's parents will have no need to follow through 
47. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern­
ment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The fourteenth amendment 
proVides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "The fundamental concept of 
liberty embodied in that [fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed 
by the First Amendment." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 3lO U.S. 296, 303 (1940). For a 
discussion of the "deprogramming" process and an illustration of how it causes these 
deprivations, see T. PATRICK, supra note 11. 
48. For a discussion and comparison of due process as it applies to "depro­
gramming" cases and civil commitment cases, see Note, Legal Issues, supra note 8, 
at 1114-21. 
49. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 2201 (West Supp. 1977); 21 J. LOMBARD, MAS­
SACHUSETTS PRACTICE § 901.16 (Supp. 1977). 
50. For illustrations of how quickly "deprogramming" can occur, see T. PAT­
RICK, supra note 11. 
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with the permanent guardianship petition, for the temporary guard­
ianship will have served their purpose. Clearly then, the mere re­
quirement that permanent custody also be filed for is inadequate to 
protect the individual's rights. 
Some statutes require that a ward seized pursuant to a tem­
porary guardianship order be given notice of the right to a sub­
sequent hearing to challenge the appointment. 51 Here, again, the 
guardian may safely ignore the notice requirement, relying on the 
anticipated success of the "deprogramming." In such cases, even if 
the ward is eventually informed of the right to a hearing, successful 
"deprogramming" renders that right meaningless. 
While these safeguards function very well in the contexts for 
which guardianship laws were designed, the statutory attempts to 
protect the proposed ward's rights are inadequate in the "depro­
gramming" context. It is far too likely that abuse will deprive the 
proposed ward of constitutional rights. The "deprogramming" pro­
cess is unique in that it is a quick method to change, sometimes 
permanently, a person's religious beliefs and life-style. Guard­
ianship laws, which were developed to protect a person who needs 
long-term protection, should not be used in a "deprogramming" 
situation. This new and different context calls for new and different 
procedures. 
First, a person seeking legal custody of an adult should be 
required to use permanent guardianship procedures that include 
the right to be heard, unless the proposed ward poses a serious 
and immediate threat to himself or to society. In making such a 
determination, the proposed ward should be evaluated in terms of 
functional disabilities. Allegations of a sudden change in habits or 
friends or of an extreme devotion to an esoteric religious group 
should never be sufficient to constitute an emergency situation be­
cause no immediate threat to life, safety, or public order is shown. 
Concrete, objective evidence that the proposed ward is unable to 
prOVide for his own physical well-being or that a devotee is de­
prived of adequate food or sleep endangering his health should 
be required. 52 
Second, if evidence is shown that it is absolutely necessary to 
provide for temporary custody of the proposed ward until a hearing 
for a permanent guardianship can be held, the court should order 
51. E.g., MASS. PROB. CT. R. 29B. 
52. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1751 (West Supp. 1978), reprinted in note 43 
supra. For a similar suggestion, see Note, Legal Issues, supra note 8, at 1113, 1122. 
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that "deprogramming" not occur. A guardian who is least likely to 
allow "deprogramming" to take place should be appointed. 53 This 
will allow the ward to challenge the guardianship at the later hear­
ing. This basic procedural framework allows the state to achieve its 
concededly legitimate interest in the safety of its citizens, while 
providing the individual with the opportunity to meaningfully as­
sert constitutional rights and defenses. 54 
B. Substantive Constitutional Defenses 
1. Free Exercise of Religion and Freedom of Association 
Parents and "deprogrammers" have been relying successfully 
on the guardianship laws that deal with mental illness and incom­
petence. 55 Their reliance and success is based, in part, on the 
similarities perceived between some of the practices of many reli­
gious sects and the signs of mental illness. 56 Consequently, in a 
53. In California, an adverse interest is grounds for removing a conservator. 
Note, Legal Issues, supra note 8, at 1122 n.184. It has been suggested that "depro­
gramming" occurred in Katz even though the court ordered that it should not. Rob­
bins, 'Brainwashing' & Religious Freedom, supra note 8, at 518. 
54. Even though the government has a legitimate and substantial purpose in 
enacting a law, "that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle funda­
mental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (footnote omitted). The government must consider 
other "less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." Id. (footnote omit­
ted). 
55. For example, ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 14-5303 (1975) (guardian of an incapaci­
tated person); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-70 (West 1960) (conservator for incapable 
person); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 6 (West Supp. 1978) (guardian of men­
tally ill person); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.02 (Page 1976) (guardian of incompe­
tent). 
56. It is questionable whether mental illness, incapacity, or insanity should be 
used at all as standards for judging a proposed ward. See generally T. SZASZ, LAw, 
LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963); Blinder, Why It's Crazy for a Psychiatrist to Talk 
About Insanity, 23. CATH. L. REv. 769 (1974); Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental 
Illness, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 101 (1971); Hardisty, Mental Illness: A Legal Fiction, 48 
WASH. L. REV. 735 (1973); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally III Lessard v. 
Schmidt, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 1276 (1974). Proof of mental illness consists, in part, of 
testimony and affidavits from psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, or others knowl­
edgeable in the area of personality disorders. This simply adds another opinion as to 
what constitutes socially acceptable behavior. See text accompanying note 34 supra. 
The definitional problems with "mental illness" result from the various contexts and 
frames of reference of the persons doing the defining. T. SCHEFF, ed., MENTAL ILL­
NESS AND SOCIAL PROCESSES 25 (1962). What may be deviant to one group may be 
tolerated by another and rewarded by yet another. Id. Even psychiatrists cannot 
agree on terms used in their own field. "[Nlo rule of law can possibly be sound or 
workable which is dependent upon the terms of another discipline whose members 
are in profound disagreement about what those terms mean." Blocker v. United 
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"deprogramming" case, the proposed ward's religious beliefs and 
practices comprise the evidence on which the guardianship order is 
based. The devotee is placed in the position of having to assert the 
sanity of both her religion and her belief in it. Removing devotees 
from their chosen sect and unduly scrutinizing their religion 
violates the first amendment rights of freedom of religion and as­
sociation. 57 
The free exercise clause of the first amendment protects the 
right of the individual to hold any religious belief,58 provided that 
belief is sincerely held. 59 Beliefs may not be questioned nor put to 
any test of proof of validity. 60 Even beliefs which seem irrational to 
most people are entitled to constitutional protection. 61 More im­
portant, all religions should be treated equally.62 Enforcement of 
guardianship laws in the "deprogramming" context tends to single 
out and discriminate against minority religious groups. This violates 
the individual's right to religious freedom. Therefore, the evidence 
of incompetence required for a guardianship order to issue must 
exist aside from evidence of sincere religious beliefs. 63 
Religious practices which are manifestations of religious beliefs 
are not afforded such complete protection. Practices are subject to 
some degree of control in order to protect society or the prac­
titioner himself. 64 A person's religious practices, however, may be 
States, 288 F.2d 853, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., concurring) (discussing burden 
of proof of establishing defense of insanity in a murder prosecution). Aside from the 
problem of defining mental illness, there is an additional question as to whether this 
condition should be the basis for depriving someone of fundamental rights. See Note, 
The Right of the Mentally Disabled to Marry: A Statutory Evaluation, 15 J. FAM. L. 
463 (1976-1977). 
57. See note 47 supra. 
58. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (defendant's convic­
tion for breach of peace when using a phonograph record to interest passersby in his 
religion held violative of constitutional guarantee of religious liberty). 
59. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176(1965) (discussion of "sincere" 
religious belief). 
60. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (district court properly 
withheld questions of truth or falsity of religious beliefs from jury). 
61. Id. at 86-87. In Ballard, respondents believed that they had been selected 
as divine messengers and given the power to heal persons of ailments and diseases 
ordinarily classified by the medical profession as incurable. The Supreme Court re­
versed their conviction for using, and conspiring to use, the mails to defraud. 
62. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (state cannot pass laws that 
prefer one religion over another). 
63. Evidence of objective, functional disabilities, such as an inability to provide 
for one's own food or medical needs, should be shown. 
64. "Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and 
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot 
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restrained only on the basis of a "compelling state interest in the 
regulation of a subject within the state's constitutional power to 
regulate. "65 This would include certain overt acts which present a 
substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order. 66 Such acts may 
be prohibited in the proper exercise of the state's inherent police 
power. 
Accordingly, evidence that a proposed ward's religious prac­
tices pose an immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order 
would support the prohibition of such practices. Even if practices 
do pose such a threat, however, a warning that they are prohibited 
will initially serve the state's interest in protecting society. There­
fore, unless there is evidence that a proposed ward should have 
known that such practices were prohibited and has refused to dis­
continue them, they should not be used as a basis for appointing a 
guardian. The individual should be allowed the greatest latitude 
possible in exercising the right to religious freedom. 
Scrutinizing an individual's religion not only interferes with 
the right to religious freedom, but also interferes with an individu­
al's freedom of association. 67 To insure that this right is protected, 
any state action forcing an individual to reveal, explain, or defend 
associations, regardless of whether the association is for political, 
economic, cultural, or religious reasons, should be closely scru­
tinized. 68 Denying freedom of association not only frustrates the 
individual, but also inhibits the growth of religious groups. All reli­
gious groups need a climate of full freedom of association to grow 
and develop. The Supreme Court has recognized that this constitu­
tional protection is especially important when the beliefs and ideas 
which the group advocates are not those of the majority. 69 
be." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (conduct may be regulated 
for the protection of society). 
65. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415, 438 (1963)) (refusal of unemployment compensation benefits to applicant 
because of her refusal to accept employment which would require her to work on 
Saturday against her religious beliefs held violative of first amendment). 
66. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state may prohibit 
adults from furnishing minors with articles to sell in public places); Jacobson v. Mas­
sachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination to protect public health and 
safety does not violate fourteenth amendment rights); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 
Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942) (state may prohibit snake handling as part of a reli­
gious rite). 
67. See note 47 supra. 
68. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (state did not show a com­
pelling interest in disclosure of membership lists of NAACP). . 
69. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 
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Minority religious groups which are relatively new to this 
country and require a high degree of devotion from their followers 
in order to perpetuate themselves cannot afford the chilling effect 
which guardianship hearings have on the growth and development 
of the sect. Because the guardianship hearing relies on evidence of 
religious beliefs, practices, and associations, the threat of having to 
defend themselves in such a proceeding and the possibility of being 
subjected to "deprogramming" may deter individuals from joining 
unpopular religious organizations. 7o Present members may not wish 
to chance open and continuous devotion to their religious sect. 
Such a chilling effect is in clear contradiction to the first amend­
ment's purpose of protecting both freedom of religion and freedom 
of association.71 The court in a guardianship case, then, must de­
cide whether or not a devotee shows signs of a need for a guardian 
aside from any consideration of his religion. 72 
2. Vagueness 
Although some aspects of an individual's religion may be regu­
lated for the protection of society, an imprecise statute which regu­
lates conduct may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague73 
under the fourteenth amendment. 74 An attack for vagueness in­
volves two considerations: (1) Whether the statute gives individuals 
fair notice of what is forbidden; 75 and (2) whether the statute pro­
vides precise standards to be used in its application. 76 These con­
357 U.S. 449,462 (1958)) (compulsory disclosure of membership lists of NAACP held 
violative of members' freedom of association). 
70. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) (compelled disclosure of 
membership lists deters freedom of association). 
7l. The court in Katz recognized the possibility of such a deterrent effect stat­
ing, "Finally, there may be severe inroads on the individual's freedom to practice his 
religion, and to associate with whom he pleases because of the threat of proceedings 
such as this." 73 Cal. App. 3d at 962, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 244. Cf. New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-79 (1964) (Supreme Court recognized the deterrent 
effect which a state libel law had upon public debate protected by the first amend­
ment). 
72. See note 63 supra. 
73. For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions regarding the vagueness doc­
trine, see Recent Supreme Court Developments of the Vagueness Doctrine: Four 
Cases Inv()lving the Vagueness Attack on Statutes During the 1972-73 Term, 7 
CONN. L. REV. 94 (1974). 
74. Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966) (vague statutes violate 
due process and are unconstitutional). 
75. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
76. See Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), in which the Supreme Court 
held unconstitutionally vague an ordinance which made it a criminal offense for 
three or more persons to assemble and conduct themselves in a manner annoying to 
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siderations are especially important when state regulation of con­
duct affecting the exercise of first amendment rights is involved. 77 
The more important consideration is that of precise standards. 
Because courts apply the terms of a statute as they are glossed by 
court constructions, the concept of fair and adequate notice makes 
little sense standing alone. 78 Individuals "cannot be expected to 
foresee subsequent construction of a statute . . . . "79 It is more 
accurate to premise the doctrine of vagueness "upon the fundamen­
tal notion that due process requires governments to make explicit 
their choices among competing social policies . . . . "80 
Guardianship statutes which define the need for a guardian 
without describing concrete, objective standards for determining 
when a guardian should be appointed do not meet this test of pre­
cision. 81 For example, in Massachusetts, a guardian may be ap­
pointed for a person who is "mentally ill."82 There is no prescribed 
passersby. The ordinance allowed "discriminatory enforcement against those whose 
association together is 'annoying' because their ideas, their lifestyle, or their physi­
cal appearance is resented by the majority of their fellow citizens." Id. at 616 (foot­
note omitted). 
77. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 257 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissent­
ing) (citing United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963)). 
78. Id. at 258 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
79. Id. Justice Brennan illustrates this lack of sense by stating, "In dealing with 
vagueness attacks on federal statutes, we have not hesitated to construe the statute to 
avoid vagueness problems and, having so construed it, apply it to the case at hand." 
Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Terms such as "incompetent," "mentally ill," or "infirm" should not pass a 
constitutional vagueness test. For an example of concrete, objective standards, see 
text accompanying note 52 supra. 
82. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 6 (West Supp. 1978) provides as follows: 
§ 6. Mentally ill persons; appointment of guardian; commitment; hearing 
A parent of a mentally ill person, two or more relatives or friends of a 
mentally ill person, a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of the 
commonwealth whose corporate charter authorizes the corporation to act as a 
guardian of a mentally ill person, or the department of mental health, may 
file a petition in the probate court asking to have a guardian appointed for 
such mentally ill person; and if after notice as proVided in section seven and 
a hearing the court finds that he is incapable of taking care of himself by 
reason of mental illness, it shall appoint a guardian of his person and estate. 
A copy of such appointment shall be sent by mail by the register to the said 
department. The court may require additional medical testimony as to the 
mental condition of the person alleged to be mentally ill and may require 
him to submit to examination. It may also appoint one or more physicians, 
expert in mental illness, to examine such person and report their conclusions 
to the court. Reasonable expense incurred in such examination shall be paid 
out of the estate of such person or by the county as may be determined by 
the court. No guardian so appointed shall have the authority to cause to 
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standard of mental illness. 83 In the "deprogramming" context, a 
parent may present affidavits of doctors, friends, and members of 
the family asserting behavioral changes such as a sudden with­
drawal from school, job, or organizations, alienation of friends and 
family, changes in appearance, and radical changes in personal 
habits in support of a guardianship petition. Because this behavior 
may appear odd, the court may be led to believe that the devotee 
is not capable of managing his own affairs and is mentally ill. This 
allows the guardianship statute to be used against devotees who are 
exercising constitutional rights. 
Ohio's statutes provide for the appointment of a guardian of an 
incompetent. 84 An incompetent is defined as "any person who by 
reason of ... mental or physical disability or infirmity, ... , or 
mental illness, is incapable of taking proper care of himself or his 
property . . . "85 This vague standard provides no guidance in 
admit or commit such person to a mental or retardation facility unless the 
court specifically finds the same to be in the best interests of such person 
and specifically so authorizes such admission or commitment by its order or 
decree. The court shall not authorize such admission or commitment except 
after a hearing for the purposes of which counsel shall be proVided for any 
indigent, allegedly mentally ill person. The court shall require the atten­
dance of the allegedly mentally ill person at such hearing unless the court 
finds that there exists extraordinary circumstances requiring his absence, in 
which event the attendance of his counsel shall suffice. 
83. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 201, Introductory Comment (West 1958) pro­
vides, in part, as follows: 
* * * * 
The statutes do not attempt to set forth any standard for determining who is 
a mentally ill person or a person who is alleged to be a spendthrift or one 
who may be in need of a conservator; it is still a question of fact for the 
court and a matter of medical evidence as to those alleged to be mentally ill 
and a matter of other evidence, generally speaking, in cases of spendthrifts, 
minors, and in appropriate cases, adults. 
* * * * 
84. 	 OHIO REv. CODE § 2111.02 (Page 1976) provides, in part, as follows: 
§ 2111.02 Appointment of a guardian. 
When found necessary, the probate court on its own motion or an appli ­
cation by any interested party shall appoint a guardian of the person, the 
estate, or both, of a minor, or incompetent, provided the person for whom 
the guardian is to be appointed is a resident of the county or has a legal 
settlement therein and, except in the case of a minor, has had the opportu­
nity to have the assistance of counsel in the proceeding for the appointment 
of such guardian. 
* * * * 
85. OHIO REV. CODE § 2111.01 (Page 1976) provides, in part, as follows: 
§ 2111.01 Definitions. 

As used in Chapters 2101. to 2131., of the Revised Code: 

(D) 	"Incompetent" means any person who by reason of advanced age, 
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deciding whether a guardian is necessary. This procedure can in­
hibit the exercise of constitutional rights. 86 On the other hand, 
judging a person in terms of objective, functional disabilities, gives 
courts the requisite guidance in granting guardianships.87 
Unpopular minority religious groups are threatened by vague 
statutes that allow conduct to be proscribed merely because it is 
annoying to some people. 88 Religious activities which may not be 
proscribed under the first and fourteenth amendments may be ef­
fectively inhibited by vague guardianship laws. 89 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Guardianship laws are presently being abused in the "depro­
gramming" context. The more protective permanent guardianship 
statutes are being circumvented through the use of temporary 
guardianship statutes. Because of the rapid changes which can 
occur in a devotee during "deprogramming," the procedural safe­
guards which may be written into temporary guardianship stat­
utes do not afford the high degree of protection which should be 
available to preserve the individual's constitutional rights. The 
statutory definitions, by allowing for the imposition of subjective 
ideas of socially acceptable behavior, do not provide meaningful 
standards for evaluating a proposed ward. The more concrete ob­
improvidence, or mental or physical disability or infirmity, chronic al­
coholism, mental retardation, or mental illness, is incapable of taking proper 
care of himself or his property or fails to provide for his family or other 
persons for whom he is charged by law to provide, or any person confined to 
a penal institution within this state. 
86. Other states have similarly imprecise definitions of the incapacity required 
for a guardianship appointment. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-70 (West 
1960) ("incapable of managing his affairs"); D.C. Code §§ 21-501, 21-1501 (1973) 
(conservator of an estate may be appointed for a person who by reason of "psychosis 
or other disease which substantially impairs the mental health" or "mental weakness 
not amounting to unsoundness of mind" is unable to care for his property properly). 
87. For example, judging a person in terms of whether or not he is 'providing 
himself with food and medical care eliminates some of the subjectivity. 
88. See note 76 supra. 
89. It has been stated elsewhere that within the context of first amendment 
rights, "[tlhe objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not depend 
upon absence of fair notice," but rather upon the inhibitory effect that such statutes 
have on the exercise of first amendment rights. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415, 432-33 (1963). First amendment "freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, ... 
[andl [tlhe threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the 
actual application of sanctions." ld. at 433. "Because First Amendment freedoms 
need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with 
narrow speCificity." ld. 
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jective standard of functional disabilities should be applied in the 
procedural context proposed90 in order to prevent the abuses that 
have already denied many persons their constitutionally guaranteed 
freedoms. 
Shelley Kay Parker 
90. See notes 52-54 supra and accompanying text. 
